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Abstract:  Most studies on the role of incentives on risk attitude report data obtained from 
within-subject experimental investigations.  This may however raise an issue of sequentiality 
of effects as later choices may be influenced by earlier ones. This paper reports instead 
between-subject results on the effect of monetary stakes on risk attitudes for small probability 
prospects in a laboratory experiment. Under low stakes, we find the typical risk seeking 
behavior for small probabilities predicted by the prospect theory. But under high stakes, we 
provide some evidence that risk seeking behavior is dramatically reduced. This could suggest 
that utility is not consistently concave over the outcome space, but rather contains a convex 
section for very small amounts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding a large research effort in individual decision making under risk, certain voids 
remain in our understanding of risk attitudes. One issue that has been hotly debated in the 
literature is the effect—and for that matter, the necessity—of the provision of monetary 
incentives when studying risk attitudes. As for many other economic decisions (Camerer & 
Hogarth, 1999; Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson, 2005; Kocher, Martinsson, & 
Visser, 2008), the effect of incentives is a potentially contentious issue, since many of the 
traditional findings on risk attitudes have been obtained with hypothetical payoffs. After many 
years of heated debate, a consensus on these issues seems to be emerging. Indeed, financial 
incentives are generally thought to leave the qualitative findings obtained with hypothetical 
studies intact (Battalio, Kagel, & Jiranyakul, 1990). Quantitatively however, incentives seem 
to matter inasmuch as higher stakes increase risk aversion (Astrebo, Mata, & Santos-Pinto, 
2009; Binswanger, 1980; Kachelmeier & Shahata, 1992). Also, while the size of real stakes 
matters, so do the nominal stakes in hypothetical choices (Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenberg, 
& Perner , 2002; Holt & Laury, 2002; Laury & Holt, 2005). 
 Even though the studies cited above have accumulated a substantial (and generally 
coherent) view on the issue, some methodological doubts remain. Indeed, although the studies 
cited used different methodologies for the elicitation of risk attitudes and thus proved the 
stability of the finding, they all report data obtained from within-subject investigations of the 
issue. While within-subject investigations are statistically powerful and avoid potential 
confounds, they also pose an issue of sequentiality of effects as later choices may be 
influenced by earlier ones. For instance, Kachelmeier & Shehata remark how “the transparent 
manipulation of prize level may have acted as a cue to subjects that their responses should 
change” (p. 1131). Read (2005) criticizes Holt & Laury (2002) for repeatedly telling subjects 
that certain choices were hypothetical, and especially for emphasizing the contrast of those 
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hypothetical choices to preceding and following real choices. More generally, the within-
subject method may suffer from experimenter demand effects, whereby subjects try to 
conform to the presumed expectations of the experimenter (Minor, 1970; Sawyer, 1975). Even 
in the absence of a motivation to please the experimenter, variations could be introduced by 
issues of sensitization (Greenwald, 1978). 
 To the best of our knowledge, no systematic investigation of between-subject effects 
of different stakes on risk attitude exists. This is all the more surprising since the papers cited 
above seem all to have some between-subject data that could be used for such tests. However, 
no statistics regarding between-subject results are explicitly reported in those papers. This 
may in part be due to the higher number of subjects needed in between-subject designs to 
reach a level of statistical power that is comparable to within-subject designs. Indeed, by 
removing subject variance from the error term, within-subject tests are statistically much 
more powerful than between-subject designs. This means that not only a between-subject 
design will need n x k the subjects of a within-subject design with k subjects ( where n is the 
number of treatments), but the within-subject design using k subjects will still be much more 
powerful (Greenwald, 1978). This may in part explain the recurrence to within-subject 
designs, inasmuch as obtaining between-subject data on the effect of high stakes can quickly 
become very expensive. Even though we do not agree with certain methodological arguments 
that consider between-subject data the gold standard to which all other results need to be 
compared (see e.g. Poulton, 1973), we think that such data may in some cases reveal 
interesting new insights.   
 We want to add to the existing literature by presenting some between-subject results 
on the effect of financial stakes on risk attitudes for small probability prospects. Even though 
our attention is restricted to small probabilities for budgetary reasons, the changes in stakes 
are substantial, ranging from prizes of €4 ($6) to prizes of €100 ($150). Also, we collected 
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data using different methodologies, ranging from certainty equivalents to buying prices 
(amounts to invest). While finding the typical pattern of risk seeking for small probability 
prospects under low monetary stakes, we show that such risk seeking is substantially reduced 
under high stakes. 
 
2. THE EXPERIMENT 
2.1 Method 
Subjects. The experiment has been conducted at GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Economique), at the University of Lyon, France.  78 undergraduate students from the local 
engineering and business schools were recruited using the ORSEE  software (Greiner, 2004). 
64% of subjects were female, the average age was 22.  Four sessions were run, with 20 
subjects in two of them and 19 subjects in the other two. On average the subjects earned 
€22.58, including a show-up fee of €5, for an experiment lasting less than 30 minutes. 
Tasks. The experiment was computerized, using the REGATE software (Zeiliger, 2000). 
Subjects absolved several tasks in the course of an experiment on lottery preferences and 
probability representations that is described in Lefebvre, Vieider, & Villeval (2009). Since 
different probability representations were found to have no significant effect, we will not 
further discuss how probabilities were represented. Two different tasks relevant for the 
present paper were used. First, a context-free neutral task was used to elicit certainty 
equivalents for a binary lottery giving a 10% probability of winning a prize and a 
complementary probability of winning nothing. Certainty equivalents were elicited through a 
list  of 26 choices (see Appendix).  
 Next, subjects’ willingness to invest into a risky and potentially lucrative project was 
explored. The investment task was presented as the decision to invest  or not in a clean energy 
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project. Subjects were given an initial endowment, and the amount subjects were willing to 
invest was then elicited through a list of 12 choices. In the investment task, subjects were 
randomly assigned one of three probabilities of investment success ranging between 5.9% and 
7% . Since this was done for both the low and high stakes conditions, and since ratios of 
elicited values to expected value (EV) are used for the analysis, this small variation in 
probabilities does not affect the results presented.  
Incentives. A show-up fee of €5 was provided to all subjects. Subjects were assigned to either 
a Low-Stakes or a High-Stakes condition. In the Low-Stakes condition, the prizes were €10 
($15) for the neutral task, and €4 ($6) for the investment task, with the latter to be financed 
out of an initial endowment of €0.60 (90¢). In the High-Stakes condition, all amounts were 
increased by a factor of 10, implying prizes of €100 ($150) and €40 ($60) for the neutral and 
investment tasks, respectively. 
Encoding. The certainty equivalent (CE) and  the willingness-to-pay for investment (WTP) 
were calculated as the mean between the two amounts for which subjects switched from the 
prospect to the certain amount (in the case of CE), or from the certain amount to the prospect 
(in the case of WTP).  
Hypotheses. Given that small probabilities are used throughout, we expect that subjects will 
on average be risk seeking as predicted by prospect theory (Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt & 
Pinto, 2000; van de Kuilen et al., 2006; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996). Indeed, subjects are generally 
found to overweight small probabilities of winning, so that we may expect CEs and WTPs to 
lie above the expected value. Finally and most importantly, we expect that risk seeking will be 
reduced significantly in the High-Stakes condition as compared to the Low-Stakes condition. 
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2.2 Results 
Neutral task. 6 subjects were dropped from the sample because they switched multiple times 
between the sure amount and the prospect. Those subjects are dropped since it is not clear 
what their CE is. Under low stakes, we find the typical behavior of risk seeking for small 
probabilities predicted by prospect theory, with a mean ratio of the CE to EV of 1.66. We thus 
strongly reject the hypothesis that subjects are expected value maximizers for low stakes 
(t(39) = 8.53, p < 0.001; all p-values are two-sided) in favor of the hypothesis that subjects are 
risk seeking. At the individual level, only two subjects out of 40 can be classified as risk 
averse, three as risk neutral, and the remaining 35 as risk seeking. Data on the frequency 
distribution of risk attitudes are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Classification of subjects in terms of risk attitude 
 
Distribution of risk attitudes 
 
 
Tasks 
 
Condition 
Risk 
averse 
Risk 
neutral 
Risk 
seeking 
Total 
Low stakes 2  (5.00) 3 (7.50) 35 (87.50) 40 (100) 
Neutral task 
High stakes 14 (43.75) 6 (18.75) 12 (37.50) 32 (100) 
Low stakes 5 (12.50) 2 (5.00) 33 (82.50) 40 (100) 
Investment task 
High stakes 9 (26.47) 2 (5.88) 23 (67.65) 34 (100) 
Note: Relative frequencies in parentheses. 
This picture changes when we look at the High-Stakes condition. On average, subject 
are now roughly risk neutral with an average ratio of CE to EV of 0.96. Indeed, the hypothesis 
of risk neutrality can now not be rejected (t(31) = – 0.44, p = 0.67). At the individual level, 14 
subjects can now be classified as risk averse, six as risk neutral, and 12 as risk seeking. We 
thus confirm that in the High-Stakes condition subjects are on average significantly less risk 
seeking than in the Low-Stakes condition (z = 4.74, p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney test). Though 
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women are on average slightly less risk seeking than men, this difference is neither significant 
for the overall data nor within either of the two incentive conditions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Ratio of CE to EV for Low and High Stakes 
 
Investment Task. 6 subjects were eliminated because they switched several times between 
investing and not investing. Those subjects are dropped since it is not clear what their WTP is. 
Again, we find the typical behavior of risk seeking for low stakes, with a mean ratio of WTP 
to EV equal to 1.88. We again easily reject the null hypothesis of risk neutrality (t(37) = 6.05, 
p < 0.001). At the individual level, five subjects can be classified as risk averse, two as risk 
neutral, and 33 as risk seeking (see Table 1). Under high stakes we now also find risk seeking, 
with the mean WTP on EV ratio equal to 1.52. This time we reject the null hypothesis of risk 
neutrality also for high stakes (t(33) = 3.31, p = 0.002). At the individual level, we can 
classify nine subjects as risk averse, two as risk neutral, and 23 as risk seeking. As 
hypothesized, subjects in the High-Stakes condition are on average less risk seeking than 
subjects in the Low-Stakes condition (z = 1.93, p = 0.05; Mann-Whitney test) (see also Figure 
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2). Just as for the neutral task, no significant gender differences are present. 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of subjects by WTP/EV ratio. Approximations of WTP/EV were used to condensate 
findings; this was necessary since different probability levels produced small difference in EV that resulted in a 
multiplicity of slightly different WTP/EV ratios. 
 
 
3. DISCUSSION 
Our between-subject data confirm previous findings in the literature according to which 
individuals become more risk averse—or in our case less risk seeking—when high stakes are 
involved. This effect is indeed very strong for a neutral task in which CEs are elicited. When 
smaller stakes are used in an investment task, the effect is found also for willingness to invest 
into a potentially profitable project. However, the effect is significantly less strong in the latter 
case  (Z = 1.49, p = 0.06, Fisher’s z test). 
 Subjects are generally found to be risk seeking for small probability prospects as 
would be predicted by the overweighting of small probabilities generally found in the 
literature (Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000; van de Kuilen, Wakker, & Zou, 2006; 
Wu & Gonzalez, 1996). While subjects become risk neutral under high incentives for the 
neutral task, they remain risk seeking for the investment task. This difference between the 
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neutral and the investment tasks may potentially be driven by either of two factors: the 
introduction of context into the decision (people may be more prone to risk-seeking in a 
context of investment in an environmental good), or the elicitation of willingness-to-pay 
instead of certain equivalents. Disentangling these two explanations is beyond the scope of 
this paper but may be an interesting topic for future research. 
 Assuming prospect theory as a descriptive model of choice, the difference between 
low and high stakes can be explained with attitudes towards outcomes, since probability 
weighting is a purely probabilistic matter and should not change between low and high stakes 
(see however Bradley, 2003, on difficulties with this separation). This is however somewhat 
troubling, since it is generally assumed that utility should be linear for such small amounts 
(Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & L'Haridon, 2008; Booij & van de Kuilen, 2009). One potential 
explanation is that the low income of our subject population of students implies utility 
curvature already for relatively small gains. A potential alternative explanation would be that 
utility is not consistently concave over the outcome space, but rather contains a convex 
section for very small amounts (Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre, 1999; Markowitz, 1952). 
 According to this peanut effect (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Weber & Chapman, 
2005), the extreme risk seeking found for small amounts would be the result of both 
overweighing of small probabilities and an increasing marginal utility of money for small 
amounts of money. Indeed, the latter would predict that small amounts of money that are 
offered for sure in our two tasks are attributed very low utility, which implies extreme risk 
seeking in the Low-Stakes condition. This approach would explain the extreme difference in 
risk seeking behavior in our neutral task not through a rapidly decreasing marginal utility of 
money, but rather through a combination of initially increasing and subsequently decreasing 
marginal utility (in addition to the overweighting of small probabilities). Notice how this 
conceptual framework may also explain why we find a weaker effect of monetary stakes in 
 1
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the investment task. Indeed, sure amounts used in the latter are even smaller and may thus be 
undervalued in both conditions, resulting in persisting risk seeking in the High-Stakes 
condition.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The importance of monetary stakes for risk attitude is an important issue in the decision 
making literature. Even though several studies investigating the effect of high monetary stakes 
on risk attitude exist, data reported are generally obtained by means of within-subject designs, 
and doubts have been aired about the soundness of that approach. In this paper we test instead 
the effect of high monetary stakes for small probability prospects in a between-subject design. 
While finding the typical pattern of risk seeking for small probability prospects under low 
stakes, such risk seeking is found to be substantially reduced under high stakes. This finding 
may create problems for prospect theory as it stands, but could be explained either by subject 
pool effects, or by a peanut effect, according to which the utility curve may have a convex 
section for low gain amounts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
APPENDIX 
 
Neutral Task (High stakes):  
 
 
 1
2 
Investment Task: Choice List 
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